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CAPE WORKERS IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, 1904-1912 
P A m S  OF MIGRANCY AND THE CLOSING OF OPTIONS ON TEE SOUTHERN ABRICAN LABOUR MAlWZP 
William Beinart 
Between 1904 and 1912, a considerable number of African .men from the Cape 
Colony migrated to work in German South-West Africa (SWA) . During this time, there 
were always a few thousand Cape workers in "Jamani"; in peak years the number 
probably reached around 10,000 - as many as worked in the biggest Cape ports. They 
played an important role as transporters and labourers in the German colonial wars 
against the Herero and Nama (1904-1907). They were also responsible for building much 
of the railway network that spread out from the ports of Swakopmund and Luderitz. 
Although their presence has hardly been noted by historians, their experiences are 
well documented. Cape officials, who felt some responsibility for their nationals in 
a foreign country, took note of their complaints. The Cape Native Affairs Depmtment 
(NU) also handled claims to the wages of deceased workers. In the correspondence 
over such questions, there are some remarkable statements by migrant workers. It was 
these, not always the easiest type of material to locate, that initially provided the 
stimulus for this paper. 
Yet, it is not merely to revive a forgotten episode in labour history that 
this topic is being addressed. The movement of Cape workers to SWA and the eventual 
curtailment of this pattern of migrancy illuminates important features of the changing 
political economy of the subcontinent at the time. The episode also serves to under- 
line the point that the subcontinental labour market was increasingly being integrated 
around the hub of the Rand mines, a process which had implications for patterns of 
migrancy throughout the area. Moreover, the material opens the way to an analysis of 
options facing workers and provides a rare though limited glimpse of workers' own 
perceptions of their position. Studies of the proletarianization of m a l  communities 
in southern Africa have tended to concentrate on the way in which such communities 
became increasingly dependent on income from wage labour without totally losing their 
access to rural resources. But an understanding of the complex processes of 
proletarianization also requires an examination of persistence and change in patterns 
of migrancy, the way in which these affected already semi-proletarianized communities 
and the consciousness of migrants. Some attempt is made to explore these issues in 
the paper. 
Recruitment for Geman SWA and the Early Experience of Mimants 
A majority, though by no means all ,  of the workers migrating to SWA came 
from the Ciskeian and southern Transkeian districts of the Eastern Cape. (1) This was 
an area in which the experience of colonization was highly diverse, where complex 
patterns of peasantiza.tion and proletarianization had been taking place over the whole 
of the nineteenth century. Two brief points of relevance to the story of migration 
to SWA should be made. Firstly, in comparison with the rest of the Transkeian 
Territories, where the bulk of the African population of the Colony was settled, 
these Ciskeian and southern Transkeian areas were more thoroughly colonized. 
Relationships were more highly commoditized, Christianity, literacy and education more 
widespread, and migrancy had been well entrenched for a longer period. Secondly, the 
feature of patterns of migrancy from these districts since the 1870s had been 
avoidance of fa,rms and mines. (2) Eastern Cape workers moved into employment in the 
ports and on the railways. Even if wages were not consistently higher in these 
sectors, migrants were able to maintain greater control over their life at work and 
bargain more effectively. (3) Especially on the railways, points of production were 
sufficiently dispersed to make centralized control by employers difficult. (4) 
Patterns of migrancy were appropriate to workers who were amongst the first on the 
labour market, were conscious of the alternatives available and the possibility for 
organization, and whose rights as Cape citizens gave them some freedom to seek the 
most attractive employment. 
Immediately before the South African war (1899-1902) there had been some 
movement to the Rand mines by Eastern Cape workers. However, the mines closed down 
during the war and demand for workers in the ports, which had to service large 
military forces, spiralled upwards. Especially in Cape Town itself, where employers 
had only started to use migrants on a large scale in the previous decade, wage levels 
soared. (5) Wage levels declined slightly after the War, as employers in Cape Town 
took concerted measures to drive down the costs of labour. A segregated location for 
Africans in the city was established in 1901. (6) But Cape Town still remained one of 
the most favoured centres for workers from all over the Colony. Between June 1903 and 
June 1904, nearly 10,000 workers from Transkeian districts alone received passes to 
work in Cape Town. (7) Ciskeian pass figures are not available but the number may have 
been comparable. These migrants found their hopes for high wages dashed. For by the 
end of 1903 the Colony, as a whole, and particularly Cape Town, was plunged into 
depression. (8) In essence, it was a commercial depression caused by the removal of 
troops, fall off in imports and redirection of Transvaal traffic to Delagoa Bay and 
Durban. For a city so dependent on its docks and carrying trade, the effect was 
immediate. And colonial government revenues, drawn largely from customs and railway 
tariffs, declined sharply. During the early part of 1904, many African workers in 
Cape Town, their ranks swollen by the large numbers arriving from the rural districts, 
found themselves without work. 
One of the few bright spots on Cape Town's horizon during the following few 
years was German South-West Africa. As a journalist noted in 1910: 
German South West Africa has been an excellent customer 
to the Cape Colony, more especially to the West, and 
statistics show that an enormous amount of trade has 
been done in recent years with that territory. It is 
common knowledge that Cape Town, if it had not been for 
German South West Africa, would have been in a very bad 
financial position for a long while past. (g) 
SWA was also to be the escape route for those Cape workers who were reluctant to 
flollow the logic of their position and go underground in the Transvaal mines. The 
option opened to them as a result of a specific episode in the violent history of 
German colonization in that territory which was as unfortunate for its victims as it 
seemed fortunate for workless migrants in Cape Town. 
Prior to the turn of the century, settler economic activity in South-West 
Africa was largely limited to trade and dispersed pastoralism. (10) Minerals had not 
yet been exploited; public works programmes and railway development were in their 
infancy. In 1903, the German authorities had actually agreed to allow recruiting by 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in the territory; a little over 1,000 
workers left for mines. (11) But by 1904 the German Colonyr S needs had been 
dramatically transformed and the agreement was not renewed. The Herero and Nama 
chiefdoms of the'interior rose in a series of rebellions which took the Germans three 
years to control. Many imperial troops were called in and, as in the Capeafew years 
previously, African labour was necessary to service the military effort. A spurt of 
railway building further increased demand. Workers could not be raised within SWA: 
the Ovambo had hardly begun to migrate and the government could not risk using force 
to persuade them; the Herero were the object of a war of genocide; and those of the 
Name. groups which were not fighting were locked into labour on the farms. At the 
very moment that the German Government began to cast further afield, a pool of 
unemployed workers with experience in military support work, dock labour, railway 
construction and transporting was building up in Cape Town, the nearest major port. 
Recruitment was soon set in motion and the first shiploads of a few hundred workers 
left in June 1904 for employment as ox-drivers and transporters in the German 
military forces. (12) In 1905, the Koppel company, which had contracted to build a 
railway to Otavi, began recruiting in the Eastern Cape, but Cape Town remained the 
most important collection point both for the military and for the railways in the 
next few years. By early 1906 the Assistant Resident Magistrate of the Uitvlugt 
location reported that "thousands" of workers had been recruited from his division 
in the previous nine months. (13) 
Migrants to SWA were primarily lured by the wages. In their haste to 
mobilize military support workers, the German authorities, or-at least the recruiters 
working for them, offered £5 a month (about 3/6 a day) with free transport, rations 
and clothes. (14) Railway workers were promised similar amounts. Though not as high 
as the daily rate of 4/6 paid in Cape Town in 1901, such wages were far preferable to 
the going rate of £3 a month on the mines. Moreover, the employers in SWA did not 
initially use a ticket system. Yet those workers who arrived in 1904 and 1905 found 
their position was not without its drawbacks. The contracts may have seemed 
generous, but they were not always adhered to. Deductions were made for clothing, 
tobacco, even travel - a passage from Cape Town to Swakopmund cost over £3 - which 
the workers believed would be free. "I only thought that I had spent £4:15:01', claimed 
one of the first batch of recruits when he returned in 1905, "I am sure that I did not 
buy goods to the value of 820:O:O." (15) Workers were paid in Imperial German 
currency which they had to exchange for sterling, and pay commission, when they 
returned to Cape Town. 
Some of the early groups of railway workers were clearly rooked by 
recruiters. A group recruited in Kingwilliamstown at 3/6 a day were told when they 
arrived that their pay was to be 3/-. (16) Moreover, in the first couple of months, 
they received even less. 
About the middle of September the fourth month, a 
spokesman related in Cape Town 5 the whole body of us 
made application for the settlement of our back pay 
being the balance for the months of June and July and 
the full amount for the month of August and we were 
told by the paymaster of the company that we were not 
entitled to any money, as we were indebted to the 
Company ... We made an attempt to lay our pievances 
before the German authorities but were prevented from 
so doing by armed German soldiers. We were asked 
whether we still intended working and as we all replied 
in the negative, we were told that we had better clear 
out, and get home best we could and if we considered 
that we were entitled to any money to get it from those 
persons who recruited us. (17) 
The recruiters, of course, had disappeared. As most of the early contracts were not 
attested by Cape magistrates, the workers ,had no legal rights to fall back on. 
Further, the nature of the country constrained effection action against employers. 
It was not only that the military was called in to obstruct bargaining. Workers had 
very little opportunity to desert or switch jobs in the barren, spazsely populated and 
often waterless wastes of the interior of SWA. As Magwayi Masarwa wrote home: "there 
is only one way from here, it is by the sea." (18) Some of this group managed to find 
their own boat and rail fares to the Eastern Cape at upwards of £5 a head. Others, 
stranded in Cape Town and Swakopmund, had little alternative but to go back to work on 
the employersf terms 
The general conditions i n  SWA made a deep impression on Cape workers; it 
w a s  a very different  country from the one they had l e f t .  I n  another of h i s  l e t t e r s ,  
Magwayi M a s m a  described h i s  new environment. 
This i s  another country, and it i s  German South West 
Africa. I was i n  Cape Town before but I could not 
f ind  work there ... This country I am i n  i s  another 
country and there i s  not grass i n  it, and we can l i v e  
a whole month without water and get some water i n  the 
second month. It i s  hard on me with these white men, 
Germans. (19) 
Mati Nyamana ( a l i a s  Jan ~ o t t e )  painted a similar picture and ended a l e t t e r  t o  h i s  
wife on what seems a desperate note. ( ~ e  did, i n  fac t ,  die  short ly  afterwards.) 
I have noticed tha t  the money i n  Cape Town don't do 
any good t o  me. I am i n  the w a r  i n  German West ... 
We touched the pen and went on t o  the front.  It i s  
very heavy, the Hottentots a re  stubborn very much... 
This place where we are  is  a desert ... t h i s  place 
i s  very sad and the country i s  dead ( i n  war) ... It 
i s  very hot here. I f  I had known it w a s  l i k e  t h i s  . 
here I could not have come here. You must speak 
with your God and pray f o r  yourself and ask from 
H i m  and He w i l l  help you . . . Remember me t o  the old 
man and t o  mother and t o  all those alive. Goodbye 
my wife and lover,  without any other i n  my heart .  
J. Motte. don' t reply (20) 
The heat and the lack of f resh food and water resul ted i n  many deaths among 
the workers. What records there a re  about the causes of death suggest tha t  scurvy 
and "heart disease1! - owing t o  the s t r a in  of hard work i n  the heat with insuff icient  
nourishment - were the major k i l l e r s .  (21) Many complained about the inadequate 
hospital  f a c i l i t i e s .  
My fr iend Henry Poswayo is  s t i l l  i n  hospital .  He i s  
lying i n  an open yard without any cover, and the only 
food he gets  i s  a l i t t l e  rice.  I used t o  send him 
food myself. The r i c e  he had t o  cook himself. He i s  
very ill. There were 10 men i n  t h i s  open yard when I 
went t o  see my friend. (22) 
But there could be as  many dangers from treatment as from neglect. Jacob Qaula w a s  
thought t o  have been "ki l led by an overdose of pain k i l l e r  which burned h i s  
internals". (23) Workers received no pay while i n  hospital;  i n  some cases they were 
forced t o  go on working even when they reported ill. 
Over and above the d i f f i c u l t  conditions of work, the workers i n  militasy 
employment faced physical danger at the front ,  especially i n  the campaign against 
Hendrik Witbooi, who had much more success than the Herero i n  keeping the Germans at 
bay. "The Hottentots" , as  Mati Nyamana noted, were "very stubborn". When a worker 
claimed f u l l  compensation f o r  clothes and money taken by the Nama, he was  considered 
"fortunate not only t o  have escaped with h i s  l i f e  but t o  have obtained some 
compensation f o r  the l o s s  incurred1'. (24) Some did indeed meet t h e i r  deaths at the 
hands of the Nama o r  Herero. The position of non-combatant labourers was ,  as  Peter  
Warwick has noted i n  re la t ion  t o  Africans serving i n  the South African w a r ,  
ambiguous. (25) 
Workers did not elaborate i n  t h e i r  l e t t e r s  and statements on the ambiguity 
of t h e i r  position i n  helping the Germans f igh t  a merciless colonial w a r .  They were 
c lear ly  not oblivious t o  the s i tua t ion  i n  SWA. A medical of f icer  who examined 
recru i t s  i n  East London commented i n  1905 tha t  
while they were awaiting examination in the yard of 
the court house, the other natives standing by were 
chaffing them, saying they were going to fight for 
the Germans. They appear to have perfectly understood 
where they were going to . . . (26) 
But they probably did not know exactly what was planned. The German authorities 
called the workers "Kaplevies". (27) Yet they were not levies in the sense that the 
term was generally used on the Cape: volunteer armies organized by collaborative 
l chiefs and headmen to fight against rebellious chiefdoms. The Cape migrants saw 
themselves essentially as wage workers-vho had faced unempl.oyment in an acute 
recession, and made little comment about the ends to which their labour was being used. 
l 
l Whatever the dangers from lack of water and the Nama, the greatest threat 
to the workers was undoubtedly from their own employers. It is not within the scope 
of this paper to explain the character of German colonisation. Certainly at the 
l turn of the century, when the Cape's wars and rebellions were over, SWA seemed a 
very violent society from the viewpoint of both officials and workers in the Cape. 
Africans received little protection from German courts. Many were employed by a 
government engaged in the urgent task of fighting the most serious rebellions which 
it had yet encountered, and "discipline" was the order of the day. Although German 
military officers were in ultimate control of the workers, immediate supervisory 
control was usually exercised by non-military personnel. Both they, usually 
Afrikaners, and the soldiers used a considerable degree of violence to keep control. 
The best descriptions are in the words of the workers themselves; there is no 
shortage of material from which to choose. 
Isaac Magadi , formerly of Ndabeni ( ~ i  tvlugt) location, recalled in 1905: 
There were four Dutchmen in charge of the cattle, the 
senior in charge was called Maritz, another was called 
Darnnie ... We were ill treated on the way up. I 
myself was thrashed three times. One of these times I 
caught hold of the sjambok. The Dutchman I called 
Darnnie put up his pistol and shot me just under the 
right eye ... I met the senior conductor Mazitz and 
asked him when my case was going to be tried, and he 
said that the case would not be tried. He said you 
natives from the Colony are giving trouble, you should 
have gone and fetched the water when the conductor told 
you to . . . (28) 
Jan Tusi described the fate of his foreman, Robert Honose. 
There was a German conductor in the tent. He was 
making a noise with some coloured boys saying that they 
had taken his hat. As he did not find his hat he went 
out to the German soldiers who were on guard that oight 
and told them he wanted to get his hat. Robert being 
the foreman ... was called out of the tent ... The 
guards . . . asked if Robert hew the German language. I 
heard Robert say no in Dutch ... Whilst Robert was 
trying to talk to the guards I heard a shot and Robert 
fell to the ground. After Robert fell down the two 
German guards stabbed him on the right and left side with 
their bayonets. Robert managed to crawl as far as the 
tent and was helped inside ... the German soldiers 
started firing at the tent ... This was Saturday night 
and I heard Robert was dead on Monday morning. ( 2 9 )  
He went on to recount an equally grisly episode of control by firepower, but 
Mbandazayo's account of the death of Bushula perhaps captures the milieu more fully. 
They were working around the northern line of rail neaz Okahandja when "Bushula alias 
Passenger got ill suffering from a sore leg". (3) He was taken into hospital, but 
Mbanda5ayo heard that his condition did not improve. 
One morning Bushula was going to relieve nature and 
one of the German nurses threw a tin at him, which 
struck Passenger on his sore leg. On feeling the 
pain, he returned and pointed to the nurse with the 
stick he had, talking, and immediately after he had 
done that they caught him, saying he was cheeky and 
beat him twenty five strokes on his back and 
shoulders. After receiving these strokes he was 
taken to the gaol where they kept him for ten days. 
When his time was finished they, before letting him 
out, beat him another twenty five strokes on his 
back. The same day in the afternoon he came to our 
tent, his back being all covered with blood, which 
was still oozing very fast. He did not sleep that 
day, and he was suffering from pain very much. His 
stomach was also affected. The next day about noon 
he died. We went and reported to the managers, who 
denied that he died from the cuts. The man received 
altogether 50 cuts. They then asked us to give them 
the dead body - we refused until they came to us 
armed and threatened us that they would shoot the 
whole company of us. We then gave the body to them . 
Persistent Migration to SWA and the Choices Facing Cape Workers 
Despite their early experience of difficult conditions and violence, Cape 
workers continued to migrate to SWA and take employment with the military, up to 
1907, and the railway companies for the next few years. In these years Ndabeni, far 
from being merely a labour pool for Cape Town, became a reservoir for SWA. Cape 
Town's location housed an increasingly floating population (32) Many settled 
residents took work in SWA, while a constant influx of workers arrived from the 
Eastern Cape and southern Transkei to survey local possibilities or contract for SWA. 
The local branch of the Native Affairs department was able to derive considerable 
revenue out of the rents of one shilling a week charged to temporary residents, and 
the railway company agreed to pay the arrear rents of permanent residents and take 
them off wages. The new function served by the location also tended to ease the 
implementation of urban segregation. 
But by the end of 1906 the German military and the railway company had 
recruited most of the labour force they needed and had only to top up with irregular 
batches. In 1907, the ARM of Ndabeni mentioned that "owing to the scarcity of work 
about here and the fact that only a limited number is required in German South West 
Africa, a great number [of recent arrivals from the Eastern Cape] m e  disappointed 
and ultimately return to their homes or reluctantly decide to proceed under contract 
to the Transvaal Gold mines". (33) Yet, despite the risk of unemployment, and the 
expense of keeping themselves in Cape Town, the stream of workers continued. When a 
recruiter was offered a contract for one thousand workers early in 1908, he was able 
to fill his quota almost immediately from the men available in Cape Town and "turned 
away hundredsft. (34) By October 1908, the Secretary of Native Affairs in Cape Town 
found it necessary to circularize officials in the Ciskei and Transkei informing them 
that "large numbers of Nativestt based in the city were unable to find work and asking 
them to discourage migration. (35) During 1907 and 1908, many magistrates in the 
Ciskei and southern Transkei, acting on requests made by local headmen, enquired about 
the possibility of sending up batches for SWA and had constantly to be refused. (36) 
In October 1908, reports also came to the SNA that workers from the &astern 
districts of the Colony had for some months been obtaining passes signed for SWA 
itself and making the 0.700 mile journey to the German colony overland, partly by 
rail and part1 by foot over some of the most inhospitable country in the sub- 
continent. (377 At first they were able to get across the border and find work on 
the southern line of rail from Luderitz, although at rates of pay lower than those 
received by contracted workers. But by October German border guards were turning 
them back. A group of thirty migrants who had left Idutywa  ingo go land) in August 
arrived in Cape Town in October, having walked the 500 miles south from the border. 
The SNA circularized magistrates again warning them not to issue passes for SWA 
either, unless workers could show that they had already entered into contracts before 
leaving home. In 1909, however, the Germans again opened their borders. Clearly the 
supply of "voluntary" workers, who were prepared to pay their own way to and from SWA 
and work for lower rates saved the Koppel company a considerable sum in recruiting 
expenses. Even if workers had to leave their home districts without passes and dodge 
the border guards they were not discouraged. One man at least was returning for a 
second spell. 
The above evidence leaves little room for doubt that the military 
l authorities,and the railway company after 1906, had no difficulty in meeting their demand for workers with increasingly little effort by themselves. This stark contrast 
l 
I between the stories of atrocities and wage irregularities which the early migrants 
I brought home, and the evidence of continued preference for SWA, demands some 
l explanation. In addressing this problem, both the conditions governing recruitment 
and work in SWA and the specific character of the workers who continued to migrate 
I there will be explored for the period 1906-1910. 
l 
I 
Cape officials were not mindful of injustices that unscmpulous recruiters 
and touts could perpetrate on workers, if only because such practices threatened 
I future labour supply. (38) Legislation had been passed in 1899, though not universally 
implemented, which specifically attempted to control recruiting by enforcing the 
I licensing of agents and runners and the attestation of contracts by magistrates. In 
1906, when complaints about misrepresentation in recruiting for SWA reached their 1 
1 
height, this act was implemented in Cape Town. (39) As in other areas of the Colony, 
, it had the effect of eliminating some of the smaller, undercapitalized agents. By 
1908, all recruiting for SWA had come under the control of one leading commercial firm 
with German connections. Until 1910, complaints about misrepresentation were fewer. 
The Cape Native Affairs Department also set up a system to handle wages due to the kin 
l of workers who had died in SWA. (claimants had to approach the authorities not only 
with evidence of their own identity but of their link with the deceased worker; 
letters written home by workers were often the best means of showing this.) 
There was little that Cape officials could do about conditions of work in 
SWA. For the reasons mentioned above, they were prepared on occasion to make 
representations. Their general view of the German colonial effort, which they felt 
lacked the finesse and liberal sensibilities of their own, persuaded them that some 
of the workersf stories could be true. However, the routes of communication to German 
officials in SWA, through the British Colonial Office, the British Foreign Office, the 
German Foreign Office and back again, were so tortuous that messages tended to become 
diluted and there was plenty of scope for delay. (40) German consciousness that they 
were being watched by the Cape and Britain hardly affected their conduct of the war, 
though it may have led them to be a little more wary about Cape nationals. It was 
only after 1909, when an able British consul was stationed in Luderitz in direct 
communication with the Cape government, that representations and enquiries could be 
made more quickly and effectively. (41) 
Limited intervention by the Cape government may have palliated some of the 
features most disliked by Cape workers. But the fact that most workers were employed 
by Koppel, rather than the militaq, after 1906 was probably far more important in 
assuring the popularity of SWA as a labour centre. There was nothing intrinsic to the 
operations of the company that made it more a humane employer. Some of the incidents 
described above had taken place on the railway works, and the events of 1910, described 
below, confirm that too stark a contrast should not be drawn. Nevertheless, the 
urgency of meeting war requirements had passed, and with it the militaq-style 
discipline of workers. The company was anxious to get the best out of an expansive and 
specialized group of workers and kept tighter control over its supervisors. From 1907 
to 1909 there were far fewer complaints about physical violence and, according to the 
number of cases dealt with by the Cape authorities, far fewer deaths. 
Bleyts book on SWA suggests that more systematic repression was imposed in 
SWA after the military victory. (42) The labour and vagrancy codes of 1907 tend to 
confirm this. However, it is of little use to equate the position of the indigenous 
population in SWA with that of the Cape workers. They worked in specialized sectors 
and were to an extent divorced from the rest of the work-force. Their wages weretwo 
to three times higher. And they were employed in an area of wcrk which gavethem,at 
least in the slightly changed milieu of 1906-1909, some of the freedom over their own 
life and work which they had fought to retain in the Cape. It would be misleading 
to paint a rosy picture, but the company and workers did reach a modus vivendi and 
until l9lO the "~ranskeikaffern'~ (cape workers) were described as "usually patient 
and ~i1lin.g'~. (43) "In the construction of the southern railway, they behaved them- 
selves and did not come into serious conflict with the overseers." This assessment 
contrasted with those made earlier by German employers. 
But if conditions in SWA, now slightly improved, did not actively dissuade 
Cape migrants from working there, contirmed migration should be located firmly within 
the context of the options open to migrants. The recession in the Cape deepened. 
Import and revenue figures continued their steady decline until 1908, when they were 
at half their 1902 level; the subsequent upturn was marginal. (44) Very few 
opportunities were available in the ports unless migrants had a firm footing in a 
particular sphere of employment. This picture has to be placed against one of an 
uneven, but ongoing, process of proletarianization in the rural areas from which 
workers came. Between 1904 and l9lO there was a substantial overall increase in the 
number of workers migrating, paxticularly marked in 1904 and 1908, years of 
bought (45) 
As has been hinted in the above sections, the only alternative readily 
available was underground work on the mines. In 1904, mine wages could not compare 
with those offered in SWA, although the actual wages in SWA, considering that workers 
did not get the promised £5, could barely have exceeded the £3 offered on the mines. 
And for the rest of the decade wage rates in SWA steadily declined; the exigencies 
of war passed and the railway company found that it needed to pay rather less to 
secure its labour. By 1908, contracted workers received around 2/9 a day (perhaps £4 
a month) ; in 1909, voluntary workers received 2/- a day, equivalent to the general 
mine wage; and in the next year the contract wages had declined to the same leve1.(46) 
Certainly towards the end of the decade wages levels alone probably cannot provide the 
sole reason for the continued migration to SWA. 
Indeed, as evidence from magisterial reports, Transkei General Council 
debates, and more especially from a deputation of Cape headmen to the Rand in 1903 
confirms, Cape workers had a highly unfavourable perception of the mines. (47) It was 
a perception specifically related to oonditions after the war; one headman mentioned 
that "we are disappointed when our people said that the work was better in the time 
of the Boers than now". (48) The reasons for this attitude cannot be elaborated 
here (49); briefly, they related to the system of recruiting, the nature of under- 
ground work, with possibly an even higher death rate, and, notably, fear of physical 
violence from the "Tshaka guards", the Zulu mine police. Nevertheless, from 1904 
onwards, declining employment opportunities in the Cape, on the one hand, and increases 
in mine pay, on the other, led to a wholesale switch in the direction of migrancy from 
the Colony in general. Between 1904 and 1908, the number of Cape workers on the mines 
increased from under 4,000 to over 50,000; they became the second largest group, after 
Mopmbiquans, in underground work. (50) But it is important, again, to disaggregate 
the term "Cape Colony Nativef1. Whereas migrants from most Transkeian districts 
switched rapidly over to the mines in 1904, those in certain specific districts of the 
southern Transkei and the Ciskei held out for much longer. 
The historic patterns of migrancy from the districts in question, and the 
spheres in which workers from these areas had developed skills, have been illustrated. 
The choice such migrants faced in 1904-1912 was not particularly pleasant. On the 
mines, they would not only have to work underground, live in highly controlled 
compounds and be subject to the same kind of physical violence as in SWA; they would 
also lose their position as an elite of workers. Having avoided the mines for so long, 
they were not in a position to obtain control of more favoured jobs there. They would 
become merely one group among the mass of underground workers. SWA seemed to offer 
a number of the advantages which had been important in previous years, and a chance 
to capitalize on their specific skills. Those involved in recruiting for SWA noted 
that the migrants to SWA were a discrete group. 
My experience is that nativeswhowork on the Mines as 
a rule do not go to German South West Africa but only 
those who object to working underground and thus are 
not available for work on the Rand and prefer to sit 
at home doing nothing unless they can obtain m ~ k  above 
ground* (51) 
Clearly they could not sit at home endlessly, and indeed when recruiting for SWA and 
Cape Town slowed up in 1907 and 1908 there was a marked switch to the mines by workers 
in these districts. Nevertheless, while SWA recruiterst comments, in justification 
of their own activities, should be approached cautiously, there is a good deal of 
evidence to suggest that the migrants to SWA were a discrete group with a specific 
tradition. 
Though migrants from the Eastern Cape may have wanted to keep out of the 
mines, their desire in itself was not sufficient to secure them the limited number of 
jobs in the ports and SWA. The question of how they managed to keep this option open 
to themselves must also be addressed. The specific pattern of migrancy, especially 
when it involved trips to Cape Town or self-financed passages to SWA itself, was only 
possible for migrants from areas where relationships were monetarized and where 
families had built up reserves of cash. Few workers from areas such as Pondoland had 
these resources. But those who actually got the jobs needed to have access to 
networks in the recruiting towns. Although many mig~ants came to Cape Town from 
Pondoland, East Griqualand and Thembuland during the South African war, they were 
newcomers and it does not seem they were able to establish such firm roots. It was 
workers from districts with long established contacts in the ports of the Cape who 
were able to hang on. The techniques used were various. Most effective was to 
organize replacements from the home district. (52) Employers and contractors were 
often prepared to accept such arrangements for they provided a continuity in their 
work force, and ensured their labour supply with little cost to themselves. But, as 
suggested in the section on recruiting, it was also important for migrants to have 
access to individual African runners who could exercise discretion in placing names 
on lists. What the evidence suggests, though does not clearly show, is a network of 
links particularly from Mfengu rural districts through to urban communities which, at 
this stage, were largely from these districts in the rural areas. It was not an 
exclusive network, but seems to have been important. 
The Minim Industry, Wilhelmsthal, and the Closing of the SWA qjtion 
The over-supply of workers for SWA was rapidly taken up in mid-1910. As 
German control of the interior was more securely entrenched and as mining activities 
had begun, the SWA authorities decided to expand the railway system, link the 
southern and northern networks, and rebuild the old railway between Swakopmd and 
Windhoek, which dated from the 1890s. The contract was given to the same German firm, 
now Bachstein-Koppel, with the proviso that they complete the work within three years. 
Again, the company had to raise a large amount of labour within a short space of time; 
again, internal sources were insufficient, and again they had to rely on the experienced 
workers of the Eastern Cape for the core of their work force. From about March 1910, 
orders were sent out to the firm which supervised recruiting for SWA; it was expected 
that at least 9,000 workers would be needed. (53) The firm agents in East London and 
Cape Town set to work. 
Their activities immediately caused a furore. A complex dispute arose 
between various factions of traders and recruiters in the Eastern Cape, which soon 
came to the attention of the Cape government and the Chamber of Mines. By 1910, the 
Rand gold mines were again facing considerable problems in raising an adequate supply 
of labour. Chinese indentured workers, who along with Mogambiquans provided the core 
of the labour force in the first decade of the century, had left. Their place had to 
be taken by Africans and, as the most rapidly increasing supply was drawn from the 
Cape, the mines were particularly sensitive to competition in this area. Further, in 
the period 1906 to 1910, the Cape government, the Transvaal government and the mines 
worked closely together to provide and control labour for the mines. The social forces 
behind this inter-colonial effort cannot be elaborated here (54); in essence, the 
Colony had resigned itself to a more peripheral role in the economy of the subcontinent. 
In the couple of years prior to 1910, the number of migrants leaving for SWA had been 
relatively small, and most had left "voluntarily'l, but now the labour supply within 
South Africa was significantly threatened. By May 1910, Schumacher, the Chairman of 
Rand Mines, had intervened to demand that the Transvaal Government approach the Cape 
with a view to stopping recruitment for SWA. (55) 
The Cape government was caught on the horns of a dilemma. While they wished 
to meet the demands of the Transvaal, they had no legal power to remove recruiting 
licences that had already been granted, except for gross misconduct. (56) The Cape 
government, therefore, took the line that they would discourage recruiting for SWA, 
and would grant no further licences, but that the legislative power needed to stop 
migration would have to be authorized by enactment of the new Union parliament, soon 
to come into being. At least some members of the Cape administration, it should be 
added, felt that they should interfere as little as possible with the principle of a 
"free market" in labour. This view was strongly supported by Eastern Cape commercial 
interests which stood to gain from repatriated wages: it was expected that £400,000- 
£600,000 would come into circulation. By November 1910, 3,000 Cape workers, recruited 
at short notice in Kingwilliamstown, East London and the southern Transkei, had 
left. (57) It seems that Bachstein-Koppel received, in ensuing months, the bulk of 
the workers they needed. 
The rapid response to recruiting advertisements affirms that this was the 
opportunity that many workers in the Eastern Cape had been waiting for. The wages 
offered to the new recruits - £3 a month all found - were much the same as those on 
the mines at the time. But rations seemed generous by contemporary standards and, as 
has been illustrated, other factors influenced workers' preferences. Yet all was not 
as well as it seemed. Bachstein-Koppel Company had overreached itself. They has 
assured the Cape government that conditions would be good and that they had a new 
batch of overseers; they had promised generous rations, housing and hospital 
facilities to the workers. But when the workers arrived they found few of these 
facilities. The company faced not only time constraints; in order to realise more 
than the minimum profits guaranteed by the German authorities, it cut corners in order 
to save costs. "The tendency", noted the British consul, "has been to effect economies 
at the expense of the labourers and in all its a~~angements the firm seems to have been 
impervious to those elementary feelings of consideration for its native employees which 
ordinary business prudence should dictate." (58) In a long and sensitive report the 
Consul outlined specific complaints; a number of statements by workers have also 
survived. (59) These touched on almost every aspect of life and work: food was 
inadequate and sometimes bad, not even tents were provided nor time given for workers 
to build their own shelters, supervisors were armed - "the schachtmeister threatens 
to shoot us if we do not do what he tells us"; dynamite was exploded close to groups 
of workers; hospitals were a.gain as described in 1904/5. Worst of all, there were 
serious disputes over wages, methods of payments, and deductions. 
The Cape workers were not slow to take action. When they made complaints 
to their supervisors they were told: "You are getting tiresome now and you will get 
lashes and be shot because this is not Englishman's country . . . This is not English 
territory where you sit down to the table with them." (60) Their response was to 
organize strikes and go-slows. (61) A company report published in the newspapers 
described the position in the months preceding October 1910. 
In most cases, where we refused to accept unjust 
demands of some of the men, a general strike ensued, 
due to the inciting speeches of some agitators as 
you will find in any large group of workers. 
Therefore the payment of wages hardly ever took 
place without an unreasonable partial strike in some 
of the gangs. (62) 
"Ethiopian missionaries" were accused of stirring up strife. (63) As the conflict 
escalated, the company intensified its repressive techniques. "Water and food were 
withheld as a means of breaking strikes." (64) As the consul mentioned, "the 
significance of this action can only be realised by those who know the country". 
Some workers deserted, trying to find their way back to the ports by following the 
line of rail; some apparently attempted to find their way to farms, miles away from 
the line of rail, in order to get water. (65)  In October, one group of about 80 
workers on the northern line near Wilhelmstal attempted to walk to Windhoek to make 
direct contact with senior company officials, to whom they felt they had been 
purposely denied access. They were stopped at Okahanja by soldiers and told by the 
local government official that they should go back to work and their case would be 
investigated. In the next couple of days little changed, and the workers - about 100 
were in the camp - made further approaches to their supervisors. The latter responded 
by calling in unarmed soldiery who had been detailed to assist in railway work, and 
demanding that the workers surrender their leaders. Accounts of events following 
differ slishtly in their details, but not in their major features. 
The soldiers came and said we want those three men ... 
We had come up with sticks and the soldiers picked 
up bottles and sticks. We came with sticks because 
we were afraid of the soldiers. If the soldiers did 
not touch us we would not touch the soldiers. The 
officer did not say anything about laying down our 
sticks . . . There was a great uproar and no one could 
understand anything ... We sent three of our men to 
ask the soldiers that remained what they wanted the 
three men for ... Many of us did not hear what answers 
the Lieutenant had sent. [~eanwhile the soldiers had 
returned to their base to collect arms and 
reinforcements.] They left the train, fell in and came 
towards us. Engineer Hansen ... demanded the 
surrender of the three men. We wished Dubulla our own 
interpreter to come and parley with the engineer but 
when he came out the engineer said, I no longer 
require an interpreter. (66)  
Workers could not give a rounded account of the action to which they were 
subsequently subjected, but a company official had a birdts eye view: 
CAPTAIN gives the order to fix bayonets and to encircle 
the boys. After the encircling has been done by the 
soldiers, the lattec are told to advance with levelled 
bayonet. At last the boys stand so pressed together 
that they cannot get any closer to one another, but the 
soldiers still advance and start now to prod the boys 
with their bayonets. I myself have seen 30 till 40 
boys with wounds of 3 and 2 inches in the m. The 
outer ranks had thrown away their sticks by that time. 
For me and some of the white men ... present it appears 
as a wonder that the boys stood that sort of treatment 
as long as they did. At last the boys were so 
terrorised that they broke through the soldiers and 
then it was that the first shot fell. Then all the 
boys fled and the soldiers shot after them trying to 
kill them indiscriminately. There was a motorman ... 
who was quite proud to tell me that he himself had 
POTTED three ... The doctors told me that all the 
wounds were from the back. (67) 
At least fourteen died, close to twenty were seriously wounded, of whem two died soon 
afterwards. Many others received bayonet prods or more minor wounds. 
Some of the workers were sent home or to hospital. Those that remained 
were apparently keen to get back to work. What is more surprising is that the 
Wilhelmstal "riotf1 or lfoccurrenceff did not frighten off prospective migrants from the 
Eastern Cape despite the fact that some of the wounded soon returned to the area and 
that letters were written home about deaths w e  zulu le eandla - by the thunder of 
the hands. (68) It does seem that in the wake of Wilhelmstal considerable pressure 
was brought to bear on the company to improve conditions and that in fact it 
responded to recommendations from the British consul and others. £750 was paid in 
compensation to the families of the dead and wounded. (69) A commission of enquiry 
independent of either of the governments, which included Dr Rubusana, the only African 
mamber of the Cape Provincial Council, and Enoch Mamba, headman in Idutywa  i in land), 
ex-labour recruiter, and a leading African politician, visited SWA in 1911. (70$ They 
were well received by the company and, in the circumstances, returned a favourable 
report, although they listed the difficulties encountered by the workers. There is 
little doubt that conditions had improved, and Rubusana claimed that his visit 
produced immediate further action by the Company. His report suggests that the 
workers he met in SWA very much wanted to keep the SWA option open. 
It did not, however, stay open for much longer. Wilhelmstal received 
considerable publicity in South Africa and provided further ammunition for those 
arguing the case against migrancy to SWA. By 1912, no further licences were granted 
although the Native Affairs Department hesitated to ban movement to SWA publicly lest 
they lose what influence they had on the German authorities in connection with 
representations on behalf of remaining workers. (71) At the same time, however, the 
German government and employers were increasingly determined to meet their needs 
internally. (72) Cape workers were not only more expensive but were considered to 
have an insidious influence on others in SWA because of their high level of 
organization. As railway building slowed down in 1912, there was no longer an urgent 
need for workers. Migrancy from Ovamboland had increased rapidly from the end of the 
first decade of the century, and although Ovambo migrants had largely been directed 
to diamond and copper mines, where it was felt that less skill was demanded, 
significant numbers moved into railway construction. Some Cape workers probably went 
with the South African armies to SWA in 1915, and there is evidence of Xhosa, Tswana 
and Sotho workers on the diamond diggings in the 1920s. But after l9ll large-scale 
migration from the Eastern Cape to SWA was effectively ended. 
Migrant Culture and Or~anization 
It has been suggested that migrants to SWA tended to come from specific 
rural communities which had long experience of migration and had developed a tradition 
of work in spheres such as transport related employment and railway construction. 
Nasson has provided a vivid description of Cape transport riders in the South African 
war, stressing their distinctive dress and organization and relative independence. (73) 
It is likely that they came from communities where men had since the early days of the 
diamond fields supplemented income from peasant holdings with such petty entrepreneurial 
activities. Purkis has stressed that at least till the 1880s railway workers, many of 
them Mfengu, were also able to forge a relatively favourable position at work. (74) 
Although evidence on specific families is lacking, it seems that such groups, faced 
with the acute post-war depression, provided the basic pool of migrants to SWA. 
Certainly the limited evidence on the cultural background of workers in SWA suggests 
that a substantial number were from the more thoroughly colonised and assimilated 
Mfengu and Christian Xhosa communities. The number of letters written home - in 
different hands - indicates that many were literate in Xhosa. The Native Affairs 
Department placed notices about deceased workers in the vernacular Eastern Cape 
newspapers Imvo Zabantsundu (~ingwilliamstown) and Izwi Labantu (~ast  on don) which 
circulated chiefly amongst such communities. (75) In 1910, one of the recruiters used 
a broadsheet printed in Xhosa, distributed in the locations, as part of his recruiting 
drive. (76) Such reliance by officials and recruiters on the medium of the printed 
word would have been misplaced in the less assimilated districts of the Transkei such 
as Pondoland. The evidence relating to the presence of Ethiopians is also suggestive, 
for it was these communities that sustained the separatist church movement in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Many of the workers seem to have been 
Christians, and a picture of a solemn group surrounding the bodies of men killed at 
Wilhelmstal includes one in clerical garb while the others are dressed in the manner 
of the Eastern Cape "school" communities of the time. (77) 
Further and related clues to the nature of the SWA work force lie in their 
response to conditions in SWA. The question of physical violence and the lack of a 
legal structure in which they could claim redress was raised again and again in 
statements made by workers. The comunmities from which they came were forged in the 
colonieation of the Eastern Cape and assumed at least limited personal and political 
rights for Africans as well as some protection from the law. This is not to suggest 
that violence was absent from their experience. "To describe the conditions which 
made liberalism possible is not to assert that liberal influences prevailed on all 
occasions." (78) But the SWA experience suggests that it was not only the Eastern 
Cape elite, the Jabavus and Makiwanes, who had internalized the values associated 
with the "little tradition" of Eastern Cape liberalism. The point is underlined by 
the workers' view of the state. To them, the Cape officials were a means of seeking 
redress and furthering their struggle; they had no hesitation in making representations 
and expected action. Some became aware that their letters home might find their way 
to the magistrates and the letters themselves became an instrument of struggle. 
Although officials were always wary, their explicit stance of paternalist fairness 
led them to share some of the workers1 concerns about conditions in SWA. 
Cape workers in SWA had a reputation for militancy. There were cases of 
lack of co-operation by individual workers, and despairing desertion, but there were 
severe constraints on such tactics. The background and experience of the workers, 
coupled with the repressive conditions of employment, stimulated combined actions by 
whole gangs on a number of occasions. In 1905, at least, one group withdrew their 
labour completely while the German government accused the Cape workers of combining to 
drive up the level of wages. The events of 1910, when workers were recruited in a 
short space of time from particular rural districts, illustrate that the migrants were 
able to maintain go-slows and rolling strikes through a period of months, despite the 
fact that they were confronted by the military and separated from each other in camps 
along the line of rail. 
The bases of such organization are by no means clear. The feature of 
recruitment in the Eastern Cape during the late nineteenth century was the key role 
played by rural headmen. (79) In Pondoland early migrants were generally mobilized 
through the networks linking traders and homestead heads, and in the Pedi areas 
through the chiefs. But in the Eastern Cape it was to the headmen, pivots of rural 
authority in the absence of chiefs, that recruiters and officials turned. Not only 
would headmen mobilize men, but they often sent representatives to act as supervisors. 
These men served both as a means whereby employers could control workers and as a 
focus for representations by workers from the same rural locations. Patterns of 
authority in the rural districts and at labour centres interacted on each other; it 
is likely that the importance of such supervisors influenced the choice of workers 
from Eastern Cape districts for types of work where direct supervisory control by 
employers such as that found in the mine compounds was more limited. 
By the turn of the century, however, this pattern of recruitment was 
breaking down, a process hastened by the rush of workers to the urban centres after 
the South African War. African sub-recruiters in Cape Town did play an important 
role in mobilizing a work force for SWA, in association with recruiting firms, but 
they tended to be drawn from the urban petty-bourgeoisie, itself beleaguered by the 
depression and segregationist measures. In SWA, new patterns of authority seem to 
have coalesced rapidly. Some of the African recruiters accompanied workers to SWA 
as foremen and their treatment at the hands of German employers tended to cement 
their identification with workers rather than employers. New patterns of leadership 
developed - gangs of workers had their own interpreters and go-betweens who, as at 
Wilhelmstd-,. were known to the authorities but controlled by the workers. They may 
also have had their own Ethiopian ministers, or at least Ethiopian ideologues. 
Moreover, such patterns persisted when workers returned to the rural areas. At least 
one group were able to collect funds when they had reached home and send two 
representatives back to Cape Town and SWA to pursue their claims. (80) For a variety 
of reasons, the authority of headmen was breaking down in the rural areas and new 
popular leaders emerging. (31) The experience of migrancy and the intensified process 
of proletarianieation was an important element in shaping new pafterns of politics and 
consciousness. As yet there is no evidence of conscious attempts to form "unions". 
The form of worker organization seems to have been subsumed in wider political movements. 
SWA was a last option for migrants who were trying to defend their 
particular traditions as workers. SWA itself was a milieu in which they were forced 
to confront more repressive forms of control and their response contributed to 
changing forms of organization and consciousness. However, the closing of the SWA 
option and the increasing rate of migrancy to the Rand mines had even more important 
implications in remoulding the patterns of organization and consciousness in the area. 
Migrants were plunged into a world where their skills and traditions were of limited 
relevance, where life was regimented in closely controlled compounds, where they were 
at once drawn into an existing, broader working class and migrant culture and yet 
forced to redefine their position in relation to a new labour process and new ethnic 
division of labour. How this reorientation interacted with rural politics is as yet 
unclear. But the acute crisis in the rural areas of the Cape between cl912 and 1914, 
while triggered by the advent of East Coast Fever and state measures to combat it, 
needs to be located in the changing patterns of proletarianization in the area if its 
form is to be understood. 
This paper is one of a series proposed on patterns of migrancy from the 
Transkeian and Ciskeian districts which, in turn, are designed to serve as a 
background to d y s i s  of the changing nature of rural consciousness and rural 
movements in these areas. The material available does not often allow great precision 
in the linkages between experiences at work and the changing patterns of rural 
politics. However, if progress is to be made towards this end, it is clear that the 
general phenomenon of migrancy must be disaggregated. Very specific forms of migrancy 
arose in different districts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Examples which are being researched, aside from the SWA case, include sanitary and 
municipal workers from Bhaca districts, sugar plantation workers from Pondoland, 
Gcaleka workers in East London, and the more widespread migration to the mines. 
Though the more general nature of capitalist development and proletarianization should 
not be overlooked in the quest for detail, it is clear that the uneven nature of such 
developments and particular experiences at work could produce, when coupled with 
differential processes of colonization, highly distinctive forms of consciousness. 
Migrants were not atomized labour units. They remained locked into constantly 
reshaped sub-cultures born out of specific interactions between their life in the 
rural areas and at labour centres. These must be identified and located within the 
broader political economy of South Africa as a step towards understanding, on the one 
hand, ethnic consciousness and, on the'other, the widermovements which at times 
overlaid them and instilled more generalized class and nationalist ideologies. 
* Research for this paper was financed by a grant from the Social Science Research 
Council. 
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